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TERRORISM ON TRIAL: THE TRIALS OF AL QAEDA*
Andrew C. McCarthyt
The intersection of international terrorism and the American criminal
justice system is a true pressure point on our legal landscape. Much of the
discussion, regrettably, is of the "two ships passing in the night" variety.
The answer to the question whether the criminal justice system "works" for
terrorism varies based on what one is trying to accomplish. That is to say:
it depends on whom you ask.
A. The Due Process Perspective
If the question is posed to legal specialists (judges, prosecutors,
defense counsel, and academics who watch this area closely), it tends to be
taken as an inquiry about due process, to wit: Can we provide trials for
accused terrorists that comport with American standards of justice,
notwithstanding the complex challenges inherent when national security is
at risk? If that is what the "do trials work" question really means, we
needn't speculate. After over a decade of experience, we can say
resoundingly that the criminal justice system provides commendable due
process and just results.
* Presented at the War Crimes Research Symposium: "Terrorism on Trial" at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International
Law Center, on Friday, Oct. 8, 2004.
1 Andrew C. McCarthy is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies, an independent, non-profit organization in Washington, D.C., which conducts
research and education on national security issues. He is also a contributor at National
Review Online and a frequent feature writer for Commentary Magazine. For eighteen years,
he was an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. In 1995, he led the
terrorism prosecution against Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven others for a seditious
conspiracy against the United States that included the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
and a plot to bomb New York City landmarks. From 1999 through 2003, he was the chief
assistant U.S. attorney in the Office's White Plains Division, responsible for federal law
enforcement in six counties north of New York City. Following the September 11 attacks, he
supervised the U.S. Attorney's command post near ground zero in lower Manhattan. He is
the recipient of numerous awards, including the Justice Department's highest honors: the
Attorney General's Exceptional Service Award (1996) and Distinguished Service Award
(1988), and has also served as an adjunct professor of law at Fordham Law School and New
York Law School.
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1. The Trials of Militant Islam - Not Just al Qaeda
Here, it is worth diverting to correct what may be a misconception of
some moment in our inquiry. This panel is called "The Trials of al Qaeda."
There has, however, really only been one "trial of al Qaeda." That was
United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al.' In that case, out of numerous
alleged al Qaeda operatives indicted on charges arising out of the near-
simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar
es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998, a mere six (obviously not
including bin Laden himself) were ultimately extradited or otherwise
apprehended. Four (Wadih el Hage, Mohammed Sadeek Odeh,
Mohammed Rasheed Daoud al-'Owhali, and Khalfan Khamis Mohammed)
were eventually convicted in July 2001 after a seven-month jury trial. All
received life sentences, the jury sparing the lives of K.K. Mohammed and
al-' Owhali, the only two capital defendants.2
It is true that there were several sensational terrorism trials between
1993, when the World Trade Center (WTC) was bombed, and the attacks of
September 11, 2001, when the nation's counterterrorism strategy underwent
the tectonic shift from a criminal justice to a military approach. But those
trials involved terrorist incidents whose connections to al Qaeda were
elusive at best.
The first two were a consequence of the WTC attack, in which,
miraculously, only six people were killed. In March 1994, four defendants
directly implicated in the bombing (Mohammed Salameh, Mahmud
Abouhalima, Nidal Ayyad and Ahmed Ajaj) were convicted after a six-
month trial. Next came the prosecution I was privileged to lead, which
focused on the jihad organization led by Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman ("the
Blind Sheikh"), which was responsible not only for the WTC bombing but
also the murders of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and JDL founder
Rabbi Meir Kahane, a conspiracy to murder Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak, and, most frighteningly, a post-WTC plot simultaneously to
bomb several New York City landmarks (the United Nations complex, the
Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, and the FBI's Manhattan headquarters)-
1 United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (Trial held in Feb. 1 - July 10,
2001) (appeal pending).
2 One defendant, Ali A. Mohammed, who was not directly implicated in the 1998
bombings (although he had cased American embassies as potential targets in prior years)
pled guilty under an agreement that he would serve 25 years in prison. Another defendant,
Mamdouh Mahmud Salim (a/k/a Abu Hajer al Iraqi), who was the most important individual
charged given his alleged high rank in al Qaeda, has never been tried for the embassy
bombings. He was severed after an audacious escape attempt in 2000, during which he
plunged several inches of a shiv through the eye of a prison guard, nearly killing him. He
was later convicted of this attempted murder (so in that sense, it might be said that there
have been two trials of al Qaeda). His sentencing is currently mired in appellate litigation,
and whether he will ever be tried for the embassy bombings remains a question.
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stopped only because the FBI's New York Joint Terrorism Task Force
managed to infiltrate the conspiracy with an informant. Abdel Rahman and
eleven others were ultimately convicted of seditious conspiracy and other
charges after a nine-month trial that ended in October 1995.
While that trial was underway, Ramzi Yousef, the tactical mastermind
of the WTC bombing who had eluded capture, was apprehended overseas in
the midst of another plot to bomb U.S. airliners over the Pacific. He was
ultimately tried twice: the first, a three-month trial in 1996 at which he and
two other defendants, Abdul Karim Murad, and Wali Khan Amin Shah,
were found guilty of the airliners conspiracy; the second, a five-month trial
in 1997 at which he and Eyad Ismoil were convicted of the WTC bombing.
Finally, in late 1999, over a year after the embassy bombings, an
attempt to bomb Los Angeles International Airport during the Millennium
celebration was thwarted when an alert Customs agent stopped Ahmed
Ressam from entering the U.S. through Canada with an explosives-laden
suitcase. Ressam was convicted in Seattle after a four-week trial.3
Thereafter, he began to cooperate with the government, resulting in the
subsequent convictions on lesser charges of co-conspirators Abdelghani
Meskini (by plea) and Mokhtar Haouari (at a relatively short trial).
The ties between al Qaeda and these terror plots are tenuous, to say the
least. Abdel Rahman is better understood as a leader from whom bin Laden
sought approval. He was the emir of a ruthless terror organization in Egypt
(Gama'at al Jslamiyah, or "the Islamic Group") which long predated al
Qaeda. Ramzi Yousef is a relative and intimate of al Qaeda operational
leader Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, but K.S. Mohammed is not thought to
have taken on that role until long after Yousef's terror spree in 1993-1994.
Further, the Millennium plot may have been inspired by al Qaeda, but is not
thought to be a hands-on al Qaeda operation.
On our present state of knowledge regarding 1993-2001, al Qaeda is
conclusively believed to be responsible for the embassy bombings, the
October 2000 bombing of the US.S. Cole, and 9/11. 4 It may also have had
a hand in the 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
but the evidence with respect to that is far sketchier. As noted above, only
one of these incidents has been the subject of a U.S. trial.
Consequently, our panel is probably better understood as assessing the
trials of "militant Islam" than merely of al Qaeda.
3 This was the only one of the significant pre-9/11 federal terror trials that was not held in
the Southern District of New York.
4 Bin Laden, of course, has claimed credit for these attacks. In addition, al Qaeda's
orchestration of the embassy bombings was established at trial, and the Cole bombing was
the subject of an indictment (on which no one has ever been extradited or tried) in 2003, as
well as a trial in Yemen in 2004 at which several conspirators were convicted.
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2. Terror Trials Satisfy American Due Process Standards
With that clarification, why can it be said by legal scholars and
professionals that the criminal justice system "works"? The answer to this
is simply: because it has, repeatedly.
To be sure, the conviction rate in the trials outlined above has been as
high as it can be-all twenty-nine of the defendants discussed above were
found guilty on almost all of the counts charged. Nonetheless, we can be
confident in the verdicts.
To begin with, the evidence in each of the prosecutions was
compelling. Contrary to the routine case, indictments were reviewed at the
highest level of the Justice Department before being filed. The judges who
presided are nationally acclaimed as among the very best in the United
States. The quality of representation for defendants was superb (with
several of the defendants given multiple, experienced counsel at public
expense at trial and on appeal, and most cases featuring very elaborate
defense presentations). Juries have been painstakingly vetted before
serving and proved highly discriminating in their deliberations.5 Reviewing
courts, furthermore, have sustained the results, often with express
approbation of the quality of due process afforded.
Thus, it is certainly fair for those whose principal concern is the
fairness and legitimacy of legal proceedings to say the system works. As a
result of trials that fully comported with American standards of due process,
twenty-nine terrorists, all serving severe (and, in many instances, life)
sentences, have been permanently neutralized as a threat to public safety.
The rule of law has been well served.
5 In most cases, jury selection took weeks and was an elaborate process in which members
of the venire completed an extensive questionnaire (developed by both sides) that probed
their knowledge of reporting about the cases, their attitudes about terrorism and Islam, and a
host of other relevant issues. They were then interviewed one-by-one, often more than once,
before the final selection process. Deliberations generally took many days, and one incident
is illustrative. In the Blind Sheikh prosecution, weighty evidence demonstrated that two
defendants, El Sayyid Nosair and Ibrahim El-Gabrowny, were guilty of the bombing
conspiracy charged in the indictment, alleged and proved to have occurred between 1988
and June 1993. Due to an error in the final instructions, however, the jury was told that guilt
could not be found unless the defendants were proved to be complicit in a specific spring
1993 bombing attempt, which neither was. Despite the compelling evidence of guilt on the
count as charged, the jury faithfully adhered to the instructions and acquitted the two
defendants on the bombing conspiracy count-the only acquittals rendered among the many
counts alleged against the ten defendants who remained through verdict.
[Vol. 36:513
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B. The National Security Perspective
But should that really be our principal concern? The rule of law, after
all, is not so much an end unto itself. It is, instead, the indispensable means
to the great end of a society that is free, just and secure. Absent national
security, neither the rule of law nor freedom and justice can take root. Thus
it is apt, when examining whether the criminal justice system "works" for
terrorism, to consider the question through the prism of public safety. As
was the case with the due process perspective, we needn't speculate about
what the view might look like through the national security lens. The
empirical verdict is in, and it is not a happy one. As a counterterrorism
strategy, criminal trials, at least when they are made the exclusive or
predominant enforcement tool, are a national security disaster. The reasons
for this are manifold-some obvious, some more nuanced, but all powerful.
1. The Failure to Neutralize and Demoralize Terrorists
To start with the most basic, consider numbers and motivation. We
now know that the ranks of militant Islam-al Qaeda, the affiliates in its
global network, and other fierce organizations such as Hezbollah (which,
prior to 9/11, had killed more Americans than any other terrorist
organization in the world)-were swelling into the tens of thousands during
the 1990's. Cumulatively, in an age when weapons of mass destruction had
become more accessible than ever before, they may actually have posed an
existential threat to the United States. At a minimum, they constituted a
formidable strategic threat. And in any event, were galactically more
menacing than either a nuisance or such quotidian blights as drug
trafficking and racketeering, which a strong society can afford to manage
without forcibly eradicating.
Under circumstances where such a profound threat was metastasizing
in this manner, it was simply unacceptable to neutralize fewer than three
dozen terrorists over eight years-and that at a cost so prohibitive in time
and resources (many of these cases even now still being on appellate or
collateral review) that one quickly realizes the system could not have
tolerated many more.6 Eliminating such a piddling fraction of a committed
enemy was a sure prescription to be hit repeatedly. And so we were.
6 Even assuming arguendo, and against all indications, that there were appreciably more
than three dozen terrorists (a) who could practically have been captured and rendered to the
U.S. for trial; (b) as to whom evidence existed that could have been used without
irresponsibly compromising national security; and (c) as to whom such evidence would have
been sufficient to satisfy the demanding proof hurdles for prosecution; there would of course
remain the problem of securing courthouses, jail facilities, and trial participants throughout
the United States.
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Nothing, moreover, galvanizes an opposition, nothing spurs its
recruiting, like the combination of successful attacks and a conceit that the
adversary is reacting weakly. For zealots willing to immolate themselves in
suicide-bombing and hijacking operations, mere prosecution is a
provocatively weak response. No one, for example, was called to account
for the 1996 Khobar attack in which nineteen U.S. airmen were killed. In
1998, bin Laden issued repeated threats, including a call for the murder of
American civilians and military personnel wherever in the world they were
found; there was no response. Later that year, the embassy bombings
claimed over 240 lives; the nation responded with one episode of
ineffectual cruise missile attacks on dubious targets, and an indictment
where it took three years to prosecute a handful of (mostly) low-rung
operatives. In the interim, when the Cole was bombed in Yemen, resulting
in the deaths of seventeen naval personnel, the nation took no responsive
action at all (not even returning an indictment until two years after the 9/11
attacks).
Put succinctly, where they are the sole response to terrorism, trials
inevitably cause more terrorism: they leave too many militants in place and
they encourage the notion that a nation may be attacked with relative
impunity.
2. Confusing Executive Roles and Educating the Enemy
Equally perilous to national security as the general philosophy of
combating terror by trials are the nuts-and-bolts of trial practice itself.
Under discovery rules, the government is required to provide to accused
persons any information in its possession that can be deemed "material to
the preparation of the defense" (Rule 16, Fed.R.Crim.P.), or, under current
construction of the Brady doctrine, any information that is even arguably
exculpatory. The more broadly indictments are drawn, the more revelation
of precious intelligence due process demands-and, for obvious reasons,
terrorism indictments tend to be among the broadest.7 The government
must also disclose all prior statements made by the witnesses it calls (18
U.S.C. Sec. 3500) and, often, statements of even witnesses it does not call
7 A terrorist who is acquitted due to insufficient evidence is not a person who will simply
return to the commission of crimes; he is a danger to return to acts of war and indiscriminate
mass homicide. Thus, the incentive on the Justice Department is to use every appropriate
means to ensure conviction. One of the most appropriate is to present elaborate proof of the
dangerousness of the terrorist enterprise of which the defendant is an operative, which has
the dual benefit of placing acts in their chilling context while expanding the scope of
evidentiary admissibility (particularly by resort to liberal rules for the admission of co-
conspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and background evidence). While focus on
the enterprise greatly enhances the prospects for conviction, however, it exponentially
expands the universe of what may be discoverable.
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(Rule 806, Fed.R.Evid.). In capital cases, moreover, Brady is expanded,
requiring surrender not only of evidence that is colorably exculpatory, but
also of that which, even if inculpatory, might induce a jury to vote against
the death penalty (e.g., any information tending to show the defendant
committed a terrorist act but was a hapless pawn in the chain-of-command).
This is a staggering quantum of information, certain to illuminate not
only what the government knows about terrorist organizations, but the
intelligence agencies' methods and sources for obtaining that information.
When, moreover, there is any dispute about whether a sensitive piece of
information needs to be disclosed, the decision ends up being made by a
judge on the basis of what a fair trial dictates, rather than by the executive
branch on the basis of what public safety demands.
This is a fine state of affairs when the matter at hand is truly a law
enforcement issue. International terrorism, however, is not such an issue,
and treating it as if it were dangerously confounds significantly different
duties imposed by our system on the executive branch. In law enforcement,
as former U.S. Attorney General William P. Barr explained in his October
2003 testimony before the House Select Committee on Intelligence,
government seeks to discipline an errant member of the body politic who
has allegedly violated its rules. That member, who may be a citizen, an
immigrant with lawful status, or even, in certain situations, an illegal alien,
is vested with rights and protections under the U.S. Constitution. Courts are
imposed as a bulwark against suspect executive action; presumptions exist
in favor of privacy and innocence; and defendants and other subjects of
investigation enjoy the assistance of counsel, whose basic job is to thwart
government efforts to obtain information. The line drawn here is that it is
preferable for the government to fail than for an innocent person to be
wrongly convicted or otherwise deprived of his rights.
Not so the realm of national security, where government confronts a
host of sovereign states and sub-national entities (particularly terrorist
organizations) claiming the right to use force. Here the executive is not
enforcing American law against a suspected criminal, but exercising
national-defense powers to protect the nation against external threats.
Foreign hostile operatives are generally not part of the fabric of American
life, and thus not vested with rights under the American Constitution. The
catalytic concern in this realm is to defeat the enemy, and as Barr puts it,
"preserve the very foundation of all our civil liberties." The line drawn
here is that government cannot be permitted to fail.
In that context, the mountain of information we are discussing here is
being surrendered to an enemy, not a defendant. If al Qaeda had expended
millions of its finite resources, it could never have hoped to amass the trove
of intelligence it has garnered, for free, as a result of our prosecutions and
their attendant, generous discovery rules. Concededly, this information has
routinely been disclosed subject to judicial admonitions: defendants may
use it only in preparing for trial, and may not disseminate it for other
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purposes. Again, though, we are not talking about ordinary defendants as
to whom a contempt citation is a grave prospect; we are talking about
enemies of the United States-guerillas bent on attacking government and
disposed toward mass murder tend not to be terribly concerned about
violating court orders (or, for that matter, about being hauled into court at
all).
Let me provide just one concrete example. In 1995, just before trying
Sheikh Abdel Rahman and his co-defendants, I duly complied with
discovery law by writing a letter to the defense counsel listing 200 names of
people and entities the government was reserving the right to identify at
trial as unindicted co-conspirators-i.e., people who were on the
government's radar screen but whom there was insufficient evidence to
charge. Six years later, my letter turned up as evidence in the trial of those
who bombed the U.S. embassies in east Africa. It seems that, within a short
time of my having provided it to the defense, the letter had found its way to
Sudan and was in the hands of bin Laden (who was on the list), having been
fetched for him by an al-Qaeda operative who had procured it from one of
his associates.
Intelligence is dynamic. Over time, foreign terrorists and spies
inevitably learn our tactics and adapt: consequently, we must refine and
change those tactics. When we purposely tell them what we know-for
what is presumed to be the greater good of ensuring they get the same kind
of fair trials as insider traders and tax cheats-we enable them not only to
close the knowledge gap but to gain immense insight into our technological
capacities, how our agencies think, and what our future tactics are likely to
be.
3. Terror Trials Reduce the Quality of Justice in the System
Finally, there is a profound but often undetected corrosion of our
justice system when we force the square peg of terrorism into its round
hole. The reluctance to treat terrorists as criminals, far from being caused
by disdain for the rigorous demands of criminal justice, is instead a
reflection of abiding reverence for our system's majesty. I have had the
privilege of working with many dedicated prosecutors, agents, judges, and
defense lawyers who see it as both a point of honor and an epigrammatic
truism that our society best displays its enlightenment by affording even to
those who would destroy it all the luminous protections of our Constitution.
I was once one of them. Nonetheless, if we are to be honest with ourselves,
it is a dangerous delusion.
Islamic militants are significantly different both in make-up and goals
from run-of-the-mill citizens and immigrants accused of crimes. They are
not in it for the money; they desire neither to beat nor cheat the system, but
rather to subvert and overthrow it; and they are not about getting an edge in
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the here and now-their aspirations, however grandiose they may seem to
us, are universalist and eternal, such that their pursuit is, for the terrorist,
more vital than living to see them attained. They are a formidable foe, and,
as noted above, the national-security imperatives they present are simply
absent from the overwhelming run of criminal cases.
As a result, when we bring them into our criminal justice system, we
have to cut corners-and hope that no one, least of all ourselves, will
discern that with the corners we are cutting important principles. Innocence
is not so readily presumed when juries, often having been screened for their
attitudes about the death penalty, see intense courtroom security around
palpably incarcerated defendants and other endangered trial participants.
The legally required showing of cause for a search warrant is apt to be
loosely construed when agents, prosecutors, and judges know denial of the
warrant may mean a massive bombing plot is allowed to proceed. For
reasons already elaborated on, key government intelligence that is relevant
and potentially helpful to the defense-the kind of probative information
that would unquestionably be disclosed in a normal criminal case - may be
redacted, diluted, or outright denied to a terrorist's counsel, for to
disseminate it, especially in wartime, is to educate the enemy at the cost of
civilian and military lives.
Since we obdurately declare we are according alleged terrorists the
same quality of justice that we would give to the alleged tax cheat, we
necessarily cannot carry all of this off without ratcheting down justice for
the tax cheat-and everyone else accused of crime. Civilian justice is a
contained, zero-sum arrangement. Principles and precedents we create in
terrorism cases generally get applied across the board. This, ineluctably,
affects a diminution in the rights and remedies of the vast majority of
defendants-for the most part, American citizens who in our system are
liberally afforded those benefits precisely because we presume them
innocent. It sounds nice to say we treat terrorists just like we treat everyone
else, but if we really are doing that, everyone else is being treated worse,
and that is not the system we aspire to.
Worse still, this state of affairs incongruously redounds to the benefit
of the terrorist. Initially, this is because his central aim is to undermine our
system, so in a very concrete way he succeeds whenever justice is
diminished. Later, as government countermeasures come to appear more
oppressive, it is because civil society comes increasingly to blame the
government rather than the terrorists. In fact, the terrorists-the lightening
rod for all of this-come perversely to be portrayed, and to some extent
perceived, as symbols of embattled libertarian principles, the very ones it is
their utopian mission to eradicate. The ill-informed and sometimes
malignant campaign against the Patriot Act is an example of this dynamic.
In sum, trials don't work for terrorism. They work for terrorists. The
only responsible national counterterrorism strategy is one that brings to bear
all of the tools of government: military, diplomatic, intelligence, financial
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and, to a far more limited extent than throughout the 1990's, law
enforcement. Employing the criminal justice system alone imperils
Americans.
